Parliamentary letter on grid congestion: eight measures for better utilisation of the Dutch electricity grid

In many parts of the Netherlands grid operators have been experiencing or are expecting structural shortage of transport capacity on their electricity grids. The waiting lists of regional grid operators contain 14,044 requests for electricity offtake with a total capacity of 9 GW. The waiting list of the national grid operator TenneT contains 212 requests for electricity offtake with a total capacity of 38 GW. The letter notes that the Dutch government is collaborating with grid operators, local authorities and market parties in the National Grid Congestion Action Programme (Landelijk Actieprogramma Netcongestie) to take action to grid congestion (see, for example, Kamerstukken II, 2025-26, 29023, nr. 597). Furthermore, the letter refers to measures taken to accelerate the realisation of new high-voltage transport infrastructure, which involves lead times of 8 to 12 years (Kamerstukken II, 2024-25, 29023, nr. 566). The Dutch government notes that these measures do not provide a short-term solution to the urgent problem of more than 14,000 companies and institutions on a waiting list for offtake of electricity. 

Therefore, the Ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth (KGG), Netbeheer Nederland (Association of Dutch grid operators), VNO-NCW (Confederation of Dutch Enterprises - Dutch Christian Employers' Organization), MKB-Nederland (Royal Association MKB-Nederland), NVDE (Dutch Association for Sustainable Energy) and the Dutch energy regulator the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) (Parties Involved) have, at the request of the Dutch government, intensively collaborated over the past months to develop measures that should enable parties on the waiting list to be connected in the short-term. According to the letter, eight measures have been identified that together have the potential to resolve a large part of the current waiting lists for the offtake of electricity from the Dutch regional and national electricity grids within the next two years.

The eight measures are set out in detail in a report titled ‘Grid congestion campaign: eight measures for better utilisation of the electricity grid’ (’Aansluitoffensief: acht doorbraken voor betere benutting van het elektriciteitsnet’), which is attached to the letter as an appendix (Report). This blog discusses the eight measures and the expected impact on the current waiting list.

Eight measures

The Report describes that the eight selected measures were chosen because they have a rapid impact, address various aspects of the grid congestion issue and have political support. 

1. Increased risk acceptance for grid operators

The letter notes that currently, the principle is that the grid must be available at all times and at all locations, which leads to high reliability at the expense of affordability and availability because a high-risk margin is required which results in underutilisation of the grid under normal situations. This measure aims to strike a better balance between these elements by increasing risk acceptance, enabling more parties to access the grid.

In the short-term, concrete proposals will be assessed based on their effects on reliability, affordability and availability. These proposals include, among others, adjusting weather scenarios and incorporating expected flexibility through financial incentives. The Dutch government emphasises that accepting more risk increases the likelihood of malfunctions (storingen) and outages (uitval). The letter notes that these risks can be mitigated by agreements with connected parties regarding curtailment and disconnection during periods grid capacity is (expected to be) insufficient compared to the demand. Based on the results of these proposals, the grid operators will adjust their working methods in consultation with KGG and the ACM. 

For the longer term, the Dutch government proposes to establish an independent advisory council to advise KGG on this complex issue. The decision to establish a new advisory council lies with the new government.

2. Optimisation of forecasts

The Report explains that grid congestion forecasts determine whether grid congestion is expected and whether waiting lists are established. The Dutch government acknowledges that current grid congestion forecasts do not always align with the short-term electricity consumption expectations that are relevant for grid congestion. According to the Report, the current forecasting methodology has traditionally been investment-oriented, which makes outcomes risk-averse and can unnecessarily block available capacity on the grid.

The Report states that grid operators will adjust their congestion forecasts to better align with realistic expectations regarding growth in electricity consumption. This will be realised, among others, by using data from the Climate and Energy Outlook (Klimaat en Energieverkenningen) and by incorporating external perspectives more effectively when preparing forecasts. According to the letter, this is expected to quickly free up regional space for parties on the waiting list.

3. Revision of contractual terms and conditions

The Report notes that the current contractual terms and conditions of flexible contracts, combined with the limited financial benefits and the uncertain expectation of demand for flexibility, create a barrier for companies and institutions to enter into these contracts. According to the Report, branch organisations indicate that these contracts are difficult to standardise for connected parties due to, for example, differences in production processes.

Furthermore, the Report describes that in the short-term, the key bottlenecks causing the failure of contract negotiations will be identified. Subsequently, legal advisors acting on behalf of the Parties Involved will jointly assess how the contractual terms and conditions can be amended to strike a balance between standardisation on the one hand and room for business-specific processes on the other.

According to the letter, grid operators are responsible for amending the contractual terms and conditions in consultation with branch organisations, which in turn must encourage their members to adopt these contracts.

The Report explains that in the mid-term, consideration will be given to how target group-specific capacity restriction contracts (capaciteitsbeperkingcontract, CBC)/capacity steering contracts (capaciteitssturingscontract, CSC) can be developed. In the long-term, consideration will be given to how the contract negotiation process can be redesigned so that connected parties with flexible capacity take more of a leading role in establishing flexible contracts.

As background information, which is not included in the letter: In accordance with a CBC, grid operators can inform connected parties on a day-ahead basis during which specific periods on the next day the connected party is to refrain from using their full contracted (firm) transport capacity. While the CBC only relates to restrictions to limit the contracted transport capacity for feed-in and offtake to an agreed maximum, the CSC also enables grid operators to inform the connected party on a day-ahead basis during which specific periods on the next day the connected party is obliged to use their feed-in and offtake to an agreed minimum.

4. Insights into expected demands for flexibility

The letter describes that connected parties currently have insufficient insight into how often and at what times problems occur on the grid and how often and at what times they may be requested by grid operators to adjust their contracted transport capacity once they enter into a flexible contract. However, the timing, frequency, duration and likelihood that a connected party will be requested to adjust their contracted transport capacity are fundamental for business decisions.

The letter states that this measure will enable grid operators to provide all connected parties with information that is location-specific and sufficiently predictive to base investment decisions on. The Report states that grid operators will soon provide an annual (or multi-annual) flexibility forecast based on, among others, a standard annual weather profile and a dynamic monthly flexibility forecast with a higher probability based on more up-to-date information, such as the weather forecast. The information would be made available via the current capacity map of Netbeheer Nederland.

5. Regional tenders for flexible deployment

The Report notes that unlocking existing flexibility through one-on-one conversations with companies and grid operators is time-consuming and yields insufficient results. The letter notes that flexibility tenders are currently only issued by grid operators to prevent grid overloading.

In 2026, Liander, Enexis, Stedin and TenneT will each issue at least one regional tender for flexible deployment. According to the Report, the grid operator must specify their area-specific needs to the market parties. Bids to the tenders can be submitted in respect of existing and new capacity and tenders can concern flexibility in respect of the use of feed-in and/or off-take capacity. Preference will be given to sustainable options but in some cases, flexibility offered using (natural) gas will be accepted, particularly if the duration of congestion is longer than can currently be resolved with batteries. According to the Report, technology neutrality is the guiding principle, but tenders can be technology-specific depending on the area's needs (for example, for storage).

6. Individual ‘Top 50’ flexibility arrangements

The Report notes that for the most promising parties in grid congestion areas, flexibility potential often surpasses what can be achieved through standardised contracts, leaving flexible capacity unused.

Over the coming six months, the Parties Involved will enter into discussions with the 50 largest electricity consumers that show promising potential for flexibility. The aim is to agree on flexibility arrangements between these individual companies and grid operators in order to exploit the potential and provide other parties with transport capacity. The Air Liquide flexibility arrangements in Zeeland are mentioned as an example of the significant impact which such arrangements can have on the waiting list.

In addition, the letter recommends extending the subsidy for flexible electricity consumption (Subsidiemodule Flexibel Elektriciteitsverbruik) (Flex-e) to an ‘XL version’ in order to support industry in realising potential for flexibility. Decisions on this matter will be left to the next government. 

The Flex-e scheme subsidises flexibility scans, feasibility studies and flexibility measures to help businesses and institutions become more flexible, enabling them to establish operations, expand or become more sustainable despite grid congestion. The regular Flex-e scheme, not including such 'XL version' as referred to in the letter, is planned to be opened for requests in the spring of 2026. Amendments to the 2026 scheme have been published for public consultation. The last date on which consultation responses are accepted is 17 February 2026.

7. Flexibility as standard practice

The letter emphasises that grid capacity will remain a scarce resource in the new energy system and that flexible use of available transport capacity must become standard practice. According to the Report, the flexibility of charging infrastructure and batteries is currently underutilised, while smart charging and smart battery use have been sufficiently tested in pilots and can be accelerated and scaled up.

In order to exploit this potential nationally, the following measures, among others, are proposed in the Report:

• National grid (TenneT): The standard will be that batteries with a capacity exceeding 100 MW will be connected using flexible contracts, e.g. time-based transport rights (also referred to as tijdsduurgebonden transportrecht, TDTR or NFA85/15), fully variable transport rights (also referred to as volledig variable transportrecht, VVTR or NFA1.0), CBC, CSC and/or redispatch bid obligation agreements (also referred to as biedplichtcontract, BPC). CSC and BPC will be the standard agreements, both within and outside grid congestion areas.
• Regional grids: For stand-alone batteries with new connections, regional grid operators will offer CSC/BPC as the standard, both within and outside grid congestion areas. Additionally, grid operators will deploy batteries to mitigate congestion where technically and financially feasible.

Consideration is being given to whether and how these measures can be incorporated under Dutch law.

As background information, which is not included in the letter: Please note that in accordance with a BPC, the connected party is obliged to provide bids to the grid operator using the GOPACS platform. Such bids contain the price which the grid operator has to pay if the grid operator calls the bid for the connected party to adjust its use of contracted transport capacity in MWh for offtake or feed in. In contrast to the CBC and CSC which are called day-ahead by the grid operator, redispatch arrangements relate to intraday adjustments.

A VVTR can be entered into by parties connected to the national high-voltage grid and to the regional grid in congestion areas. Based on a VTTR, a connected party is only entitled to transport capacity if the grid operator has made available the capacity on a day-ahead basis.

A TDTR entitles the connected party the right to use its contracted transport capacity during at least 85% of the year (7,446 hours). For the remaining hours, up to a maximum of 15% of the year (1,314 hours), the grid operator may restrict the transport capacity. In return for offering this flexibility, the connected parties receive a discount to their grid tariffs. This transport right is only available on TenneT’s national high voltage grid.

A TBTR entitles the connected party to use its contracted transport capacity during the set time periods defined in the contract. A TBTR can be made available to large-scale consumers connected to regional grids if sufficient remaining capacity is available for the requested transport capacity during these ‘time blocks’. The time blocks can be daily time blocks (e.g. set hours during the night) or can relate to a weekly or monthly use pattern. Outside the contracted time blocks, the connected party cannot use its transport capacity.

8. Contracting above the minimum financial threshold

Under Dutch law, grid operators are currently obliged to procure flexibility for congestion management up to a minimum financial threshold. Above this minimum threshold, grid operators are not required to procure flexibility for congestion management. The costs incurred by grid operators for contracting flexibility will be incorporated into the grid tariffs, but only to the extent such costs have been incurred in a cost-effective manner (doelmatig). According to the Report, the main reason that grid operators have been cautious about incurring costs for congestion management above the financial threshold is because of uncertainty regarding the interpretation of 'cost-effective'. As a result, grid operators are uncertain if all costs they would incur for contracting flexibility could be incorporated in the grid tariffs they charge. 

According to the Report, market parties are willing to provide flexibility but are of the opinion that they receive insufficient compensation. The letter notes that grid operators have prioritised contracting flexibility to try to ensure grid safety over contracting flexibility to grant additional market parties grid access. The Report notes that grid operators are less inclined to make large expenditures when it concerns connecting parties on the waiting list, while research by, among others, an Ecorys study shows that the social benefits of connecting parties on the waiting list are considerable. In addition, the Report states, with reference to a BGC study, that the social costs of grid congestion are EUR 10-40 billion. 

The letter proposes that grid operators shall proactively procure flexibility above the minimum threshold to free up as much capacity as possible for parties on the waiting list for offtake capacity. The aim is to contract an additional €500 million per year above the minimum financial threshold in 2026 and 2027 in a cost-effective manner. The effects on the grid tariffs will depend, among others, on the market price for the procured flexibility. The letter states that the Dutch government will monitor the effect on grid tariffs and the new Dutch government can consider the impact in the broader perspective of the affordability of grid tariffs.

Expected impact of the measures

According to the Report, the measures are expected to free up a maximum of 5-10 GW of capacity by 2030 and 10-20 GW by 2035 for parties on the waiting list. For context: As mentioned at the beginning of this blog, the letter states that the 14,044 requests on the regional grid operators' waiting lists total more than 9 GW, whilst TenneT's waiting list for offtake capacity comprises 212 requests totalling 38 GW. The eight measures would enable a substantial number of companies and institutions to be connected to the grid. To put this in perspective: According to TenneT, peak offtake demand on the entire Dutch electricity grid is currently approximately 19 GW and is expected to rise to approximately 27 GW by 2030.

The Dutch government emphasises that all Parties Involved must fulfil their responsibilities in order for the eight measures to succeed. In the biannual progress report on grid congestion which will be published at the end of March 2026, the Dutch government will set out specific, time-bound targets for reducing the waiting lists and freeing up transport capacity as part of this grid congestion campaign. As also noted in the letter, this letter is published during the formation period of a new Dutch government. This means that the new government may decide to change or implement different measures than those set forth in the letter of 4 February 2026.